Archive for the 'Policy' Category

Glasvezelnetwerken en gemeentes (aanbevelingen)

Uit het I-Vision rapport vloeien de volgende aanbevelingen voort:

a) omdat het gebruik van breedbanddiensten niet direct verbonden is met de aanleg van glasvezelinfrastructuur, zijn op dit moment alleen korte termijn effecten bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van sociaal kapitaal en sociale cohesie van wijkbewoners zichtbaar. Voor de analyse van lange termijn effecten op het gebied van werkgelegenheid, educatie, vergrijzing, etc. is vervolgonderzoek nodig,

b) het is noodzakelijk om synergie tussen breedbandbenutting en economische doelstellingen (bijv. het creëren van werkgelegenheid, kosten besparingen voor bedrijven, etc.) te ontwikkelen,

c) het monitoren van de verschillenden glasvezelinitiatieven is noodzakelijk. Dit project is een eerste stap in deze richting, maar er zijn vervolgstappen nodig die ook nieuwe methoden van het monitoren zoals metingen van internetactiviteiten onder gebruikers moeten omvatten,

d) het is noodzakelijk om de uitrol van bestaande glasvezelinitiatieven van bijvoorbeeld “Ons Net Eindhoven” verder te faciliteren zodat de beleidsdoelstellingen voor 2010 gehaald kunnen worden,

e) omdat de uitrol van een glasvezelinfrastructuur in Eindhoven de basis voor de nieuwe breedbanddiensten creëert is, zijn er opties voor nieuwe lokale initiatieven (op gebieden zoals e-learning of e-health) die door bewoners in samenwerking met locale bedrijven en (semi-) overheidsinstellingen kunnen worden gebruikt en

f) de gerichte benutting van glasvezelnetwerken in krachtwijken is aan te bevelen.

De empirische analyse onder private glasvezelgebruikers laat zien dat a) de coördinatie vanuit de gemeente en de samenwerking met marktpartijen belangrijke factoren zijn geweest voor de uitrol van glasvezelnetwerken in de regio, b) glasvezelnetwerken een structurele bijdrage hebben geleverd aan de ontwikkeling van sociale contacten en sociale cohesie tussen buurtbewoners in Tongelre, c) de aanleg van glasvezelnetwerken verbonden moet zijn met maatschappelijke doelstellingen, die tot nu toe door woningbouwcorporaties (en de gemeente) gewaarborgd waren, d) gebruikers met lager inkomen en lager opleiding overproportioneel van glasvezelnetwerken profiteren en e) het open karakter van het glasvezelnetwerk van “Ons Net” Eindhoven meer mogelijkheden voor innovatie en het testen van nieuwe breedbanddiensten in de verschillende wijken in Eindhoven bied.

Het onderzoek op bedrijventerreinen heeft de volgende resultaten opgeleverd a) een versnelde uitrol kan worden bereikt door een coördinatie vanuit de gemeente en de samenwerking met marktpartijen bij de implementatie van glasvezelnetwerken, b) de glasvezelinitiatieven op bedrijventerreinen hebben meer beweging op de breedbandmarkt veroorzaakt (met positieve effecten voor gebruikers) en c) de benutting van FTTH initiatieven van verschillende marktpartijen en (semi) overheidsinstellingen is op dit moment nog onvoldoende georganiseerd. Het rapport kan opgevraagd worden bij het secretariaat Sectie Technologie en Beleid, Faculteit Technologie Management, TU Eindhoven.

 

 

 

Turn to the US to see what is coming in Europeland?

A recently published ebook characterizes the history of Verizon, SBC, Qwest, and BellSouth’s (the Bell companies), their fiber optic broadband promises and the consequences that have harmed US economic growth because these companies never delivered and kept most of the money, about $200 billion!!!! In the early 1990’s, the Clinton-Gore Administration pushed the “Information Superhighway”, for which every Bell company - SBC, Verizon, BellSouth and Qwest - made commitments. The idea was that fiber optic wires would replace traditional copper wiring. The idea was that “by 2006, 86 million households should have had a service capable of 45 Mbps in both directions, (to and from the customer) could handle over 500 channels of high quality video and be deployed in rural, urban and suburban areas equally.” And in addition these networks were open to competition. In order to pay for this, the different states in the US removed constraints on the Bells’ profits as well as gave other financial perks. As the result these companies were literally able to “print money” collected in the form of higher phone rates and tax breaks…..

For details about the book, chapters, highlights, etc.
http://www.newnetworks.com/broadbandscandals.htm

Amsterdam’s Information “railroad”?

Amsterdam heeft laten weten dat er wethouders bestaan met een visie : Aanleg van een telecom infrastructuur die in de nabije toekomst diensten door andere (derde) marktpartijen worden aangeboden. Wij praten hier over een lange termijnvisie (15 tot 30 jaar). De discussie daaromheen heb ik al een beetje gekarakteriseerd, de bestaande marktpartijen vinden het bepaald niet interessant, maar hoe zit het met de eventuele behoefte vanuit de business community?

Wat zegt de geschiedenis en wat is de economisch basis voor deze visie? De geschiedenis (kijk bijvoorbeeld naar de groei van het telefoonnetwerk in de VS aangelegd door Western Union, AT&T en andere bedrijven voor 1910) leert ons dat er in het begin van het telecom tijdsperk een sterk behoefte was vanuit de businesscommunity om een stabiel en “unified” telecom netwerk te hebben.  Is dat nu ook nog zo? Er zijn wat analogieën:  “Information highway” versus “information railroad”(moeten locale overheden de “straten” aanleggen over die internet verkeer gaat? Moeten  “vrachtwagens” voor het gebruik van deze “straten” meer betalen?) of “common carriage” versus “private roads” (common carriage voor “vrachtwagen”?)  of “information service” versus “information transport”. De discussie is nog maar net begonnen, maar een ding is zeker: er wordt een groei van nieuwe diensten verwacht, waardoor investeringen in de infrastructuur noodzakelijk zijn: ook voor het businessklimaat.  De vraag is alleen wie moet er voor betalen en hoe gaat dit geregeld worden?

 

VoIP & “technological” foreclosure?

What if, KPN designs its new all IP network in a way that new VoIP providers have problems entering the market? Nothing will happen. Why not? Because there is no regulatory concept that would prevent it. Actually there is nothing wrong with KPN’ strategy to have more switches that allow the SS7 signalling system instead of softswitches. Such network would provide first mover advantages in the new markets for VoIP. If new entrants get worried they should adress this issue now. Even if something like “technological” foreclosure does not exist in the regulatory literature yet……

Dutch Imitators: Results of the European Innovation Scoreboard

How does it look like with the innovative performance in the Netherlands? We hear a lot from government officials about “there are problems” and “lets create a new committee/innovation platform” to solve this. But what are the reasons? According to the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), the Netherlands are currently an average performer in the European Union. Nothing more, nothing less. The leading countries are currently Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Sure, the Netherlands still perform better than “catching up” and “loosing ground” countries, but this is surely less interesting. What are the reasons for the current position of the Netherlands? According to the EIS, there are a number of reasons. One of the most important reasons is the lack of science and engineering (S&E) students (around 60 percent of EU average). This is serious and has been discussed extensively. The current advice for the problem is (actually similar to US policies) highly trained immigrants (in particular from Eastern Europe). A second important reason is the continuous decline in the intensity of business R&D since 1999. Currently, business R&D is just 80 percent of the EU average. What is happen to this investment, where did it go? There definitely is a link to the burst of the DotCom bubble in 1999 and of the technology stocks, but there is more. Is it that the innovative climate has changed in such a way that innovative Dutch companies move abroad to develop innovations? Like Philips did in moving R&D from Eindhoven to Leuven? Maybe that both trends, insufficient S&E graduates and insufficient R&D business investment reinforce each other?

CPB: There are no market distortions in the broadband market!???

A recent report by CPB concludes that there are no market distortions in broadband markets in the Netherlands. This report comes at a time when the discussion about municipalities investing in broadband has never been as political as currently. There is no consensus in the European Commission about this issue with DG Competition (Nelly Kroes) “extensively studying this issue” as it apparently conflicts with Article 87 of EC Treaty and with DG Information Society (Vivian Reding) granting exceptions to less favored regions in the European Union In the Netherlands, a number of stakeholders like cable operators have made quite clear that they are not interested in additional competitors on their turf (statement R. van Esch, VECAI). Despite of these calls, investment in broadband infrastructure (FTTH networks) by alternative providers sometimes in conjunction with support from municipalities is still growing. As there are no guidelines provided by Dutch ministries and the parliament this issue remains unresolved: That means there is legal and regulatory uncertainty, one of the worst cases for private investment.

Why is the CPB report in this situation so tragic? Very simple because it uses a static approach. Despite of all the fuss about externalities, increasing returns, lock in, etc. A dynamic approach in conjunction with the analysis of experience elsewhere would have done much better. The dynamic issue here are: First, “path-dependency” (a concept used in the anti-trust cases against Microsoft), simply explained means not only that “history matters” (in this case the behavior of incumbents like cable and telecom operators) but that their (demand as well as supply) externalities are very important. Therefore the marketing (customer) base, the billing capabilities, the technological (e.g. installation of new technologies) capabilities of incumbents can make life for a new entrant not only difficult but impossible. There is evidence of path dependent behavior of KPN in the market for broadband access. That brings me to the second issue “joint dominance” a new concept developed in the anti-trust literature in the United Kingdom to characterize the (joint) behavior of two companies (e.g. cable and telecom companies) to coordinate their behavior. What kind of consequences has this kind of behavior for apparently broadband markets that are “well-functioning”? But the third point ignored by CBP is much more severe. Broadband does not equal broadband and the technical definition of broadband is not (CBP) “instantaneously” changing over time. In contrast there is a qualitative difference between traditional (DSL, Cable) broadband and Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) as FTTH can offer more than 1 Gbit/s and supports all three services (i.e. voice, data and video). There are even commonly agreed definitions on FTTH by the ITU. This qualitative difference is vital for the analysis as we talk about FTTH as the cornerstone of next generation networks (NGN) something traditional broadband networks can currently not offer, but might even trying to prevent…. The fourth point omitted by CPB is important for municipalities intending to invest in FTTH networks. As first experiences in the US show these new networks are not in the same markets as traditional (cable and telecom) operators but they serve different market segments.

If we take all these criticisms into account what remains of the initial report? Probably not the conclusions, even if the 130 page document looks like a solid theoretical piece of analysis. Furthermore I am personally interested in an empirical analysis of the network effects of broadband networks, a part of the report which is currently considered as confidential (why?). Another issue which is interesting to look at is the role of geographical markets in the analysis. Why is the relevant geographical market always the Netherlands, maybe we find evidence of (joint) dominance in areas which are much narrower defined? A test based on postcodes (as CBP uses in its report) can give some indication about dominance issues but I am sure if we disentangle the provision of broadband access and internet access and a look at linkages between the companies providing broadband access and internet access a totally different picture might emerge.

Incumbent companies and subsidies hamper innovation in the Netherlands!?

There has been interesting advice from the group of economic advisors (REA) to the Dutch parliament to solve the Dutch “growth dilemma”. In their analysis, they conclude that - in the past - growth and innovation have not been linked, but that regulation and anti-trust legislation apparently supported incumbent companies in the Netherlands. Therefore there is a need to support “challengers”, in REA speak small companies, foreign investors and highly qualified immigrants that should provide for innovation in industries, capital and labor markets. As the Netherlands has in the past been characterized by more imitation than innovation, this strategy is not anymore sufficient for country in close proximity to technology leaders. In other words, imitation is “out” and investment in R&D and education as well as an open climate for entrepreneurship based on diversity and challengers is “in”.

This advice has been the result of a discussion about “Backing Winners” vis-à-vis “Backing Challengers”. Starting in 2003 the begin of the discussion was marked by AWT* report on “Backing Winners” proposing that the specific strengths of the Dutch industrial structure should be fostered and companies that already have a strong (international) competitive position should be fostered. In contrast, the article “Innovation in the Netherlands: The Market Falters and the Government Fails” argued that more market competition will stimulate innovation and that breaking up of existing institutional arrangements, for example, in markets for technology or labor markets will increase innovation. The authors concluded that policy interventions to stimulate innovations in the Netherlands should not be driven by “backing winners”, but by the motivation to “back challengers”. All these arguments have been criticized on the basis on the basis that they do not take the specifics of particular industries into account. But that it is not the problem of “government failure” vis-à-vis “market failure” but a government not willing to follow European guidelines with respect to R&D investment (Lissabon strategy).

Some of this discussion can be found in the REA advice but there still in there is the idea of “Backing Challengers” which means effectively due to investing in “challengers”, innovation in the long term in “winners” will be sacrificed. This actually might open the way up for “government failure”…..

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* Advisory body for Science and Technology Policy in the Netherlands